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Abstract. The article considers the methods that affect the operation of the in-
trusion detection system. Using the “disconnection task,” a two-stage criterion 
for detecting anomalies in computer networks has been formed, which provides 
an analysis of network infrastructure characteristics and their identification with 
specific computer attacks and provides the ability to respond to possible attacks 
in real-time. 
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1 Introduction and Task Setting 
Based on the annual rate of increase in the number of incidents in cyberspace, we can 
conclude that it is necessary to independently include in the integrated information 
security system critical infrastructure of automated means of detecting computer at-
tacks and other dangerous divisions, including threats of man-made and natural (ran-
dom) nature. 
Modern Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) to achieve information security goals 
constantly monitor the functioning of hardware and software platforms of the network 
infrastructure and record several quantitative and qualitative indicators of their work: 
 {X1(t), …, XN(t)} (1) 
where t is the time at which the measurement of the indicator Xk(t). 
Such indicators, in particular in the NIDES system [1], are: 
 Ability to use the CPU separately by the system and the user. 
 Time to complete the process. 
 Total amount of memory used during the execution of the process and its maxi-
mum size during execution. 
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 Number of open files at runtime; the number of page failures. 
 Amount of information read from the disk. 
 Number of I/O characters during application execution. 
 Username changed during the execution of the application. 
 Start time of the application. 
 Number of signals received during the execution of the application. 
 Application was running on the remote station and the name of this station 
 Name of the application that was used on the remote station. 
 Application was running on the local station and the name of this station, the name 
of the application used on the local station, etc. 
2 Problem Formulation 
With this in mind, this article aims to build a model of intrusion detection system that 
would detect network anomalies in real-time and with the least error, as well as find 
answers to the following questions [2]: 
 What happened online? 
 What was attacked and how dangerous is the attack? 
 When and where did the attack start? 
 Who is the malefactor? 
 How and as a result of what there was the invasion? 
Accordingly, the complexity of the attacking party’s tasks to create cryptographic 
software tools for attacks is significantly simplified, and the effectiveness of solving 
problems of recovery (decryption) of cryptosystem data, which are encrypted with 
software tools for attacks, has an objective tendency to constant decline from year to 
year. At the same time, there are such groups of threats related to reliability [3–5]: 
 Cryptographic primitive programming errors. 
 Errors in the use of cryptographic primitives in crypto providers. 
 Errors in transferring parameters to the crypto provider and returning processing 
results. 
 Errors in the failure of the hardware platform. 
 Accidental and intentional violations of the integrity of programs and data of cryp-
to providers. 
These factors may be prerequisites for the formation of hidden channels of leakage of 
information about the operation of cryptographic software tools for attacks. Consider 
two options for attacks on the implementation of software tools for attacks that do not 
involve the presence of critical information about their work. 
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3 Crypto Attack Mechanics 
Premise 1. There is a certain cryptographic software tool for attacks (cryptosystem) 
with secret keys based on a stable block symmetric cryptographic algorithm, which 
provides encryption in output feedback (OFB) mode or otherwise tampering with 
feedback [6]. It is necessary: to build an attack on the implementation of the specified 
cryptosystem to ensure the possibility of partial or complete recovery of information 
(decryption). 
This mode of operation of the crypto algorithm is widely used to build fully con-
nected communication networks, in which each subscriber must send a message to 
any other subscriber of this network. 
This mode is characterized by the presence of an initialization vector IV is random 
number, which provides at an acceptable level the probability of not overlapping the 
cipher in the case of using one key K for some time [6]. The idea of the attack on this 
cryptosystem is to implement a fictitious random data generator of the crypto algo-
rithm, which is included instead of the real pseudorandom number generator, provides 
a hidden repetition of initialization vectors or keys. As a result, some messages will 
be encrypted in the same way: 
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 (2) 
where ?̃?1, … , ?̃?𝑚𝑗  are open messages; ?̃?𝑗 , 𝑗 = 0.2
𝑘 − 1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ is a sequence of gamma charac-
ters formed from a single initialization vector and an algorithm key; ?̃?1, … , ?̃?𝑚𝑗  are 
corresponding encrypted messages. 
In this case, depending on the number of equally encrypted messages 𝑚𝑗 and re-
dundancy of the source texts of the messages, the corresponding encrypted messages 
can be partially or completely decrypted [7]. To repeat the initialization vectors IV the 
random bit generator should be used as follows: 
   bkIV  ,...,,,...,, 2121   (3) 
where 𝛼1, 𝛼2, … , 𝛼𝑘 is the sequence of random bits; 𝜑(… ) some unambiguous func-
tion that expands the random sequence to a given size b; 𝛽1, 𝛽2, … , 𝛽𝑏  is coordinates 
of the initialization vector. 
To solve the problem, we first calculate the allowable number of random bits to 
provide the required number of repetitions of equally encrypted messages. Let in the 
network M subscribers, each of whom sends on average daily 𝜇 messages for each 
connection direction. With T is public key validity period (days). Then the average 
number of messages sent 𝑁 is the value: 
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During the specified period, the average number of repetitions 𝑅 each of 2𝑘 the values 
of vectors of random bits 〈𝛼1, 𝛼2, … , 𝛼𝑘〉 in the case of their even distribution will be: 
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Based on equation (5) we obtain an estimate of the allowable number of random bits: 
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Using inequality (2) in each case of the attacked network, it is possible to calculate 
the allowable number of random bits to provide an average static number of 𝑅 equally 
encrypted messages. Of course, random data used for cryptographic transformations 
are subject to statistical testing, but the length of the vector is quite small. IV (block 
length for most standard cryptographic algorithms is 64 or 128 bits) significantly 
limits the ability to apply statistical criteria. To check the uniformity of the distribu-
tion of sequences of this length, the criteria of frequencies of signs and bigram are 
mainly used [8], which puts forward the appropriate requirements for the expansion 
function. Therefore, it is clear that to ensure the equal occurrence of bigrams in the 
binary vector 〈𝛼1, 𝛼2, … , 𝛼𝑘〉 appropriate value k choose a multiple of four (there are 
four options for bigram 00, 01, 10, 00). 
For example, in the case of a special network that includes M = 10 subscribers with 
an average intensity of sending messages during the validity of one network key  
𝜇 ∙ 𝑇 = 10 to obtain the average number of repetitions of encryption 𝑅 = 2 it is nec-
essary to have several random bits no more 𝑘 ≤ 7. 
To hide statistical dependencies in vector IV and obtain the required number of bits 
in the corresponding expression as a function , you should use a stable hash func-
tion, such as MD5, which is part of the standard set of Windows algorithms, or simi-
lar. Thus from 128 bits of the digest which we receive using a hash function, we will 
use the necessary quantity. 
Premise 2. Suppose that there is a software tool for implementing attacks (cryp-
tosystem), built on a stable symmetric block cryptographic encryption algorithm in 
OFB mode using public key distribution based on the El Gamal protocol [6]. The task 
is to organize an attack on the implementation of the cryptosystem in such a way as to 
ensure complete decryption. 
Initially, the operation of the cryptosystem in the El Gamal protocol using a cyclic 
element g of some field and the secret key of the asymmetric algorithm x is formed 
public key y: 
 pgy x mod  (7) 
where p is some large prime number, 1024 bits long. 
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To encrypt the session key of the symmetric algorithm, a random number k is gener-
ated, the value is calculated: 
 pgy k mod1  . (8) 
and the secret key of the symmetric algorithm is encrypted K: 
 pyK k mod . (9) 
Pair (δ,y1) together with the encrypted message is transmitted to the owner of the se-
cret key x, which is based on the obtained pair (δ,y1) calculates the secret key of a 
symmetric algorithm K: 
 pyK x mod1
  . (10) 
We organize an attack on the specified protocol by substituting a random number k 
with a pseudo-random one so that the testing system does not reveal this fact. Let 
k{t., t=1,2,…,}, at the same time power  the set of valid values of the pseudo-
random number k choose a fairly large, but less than the performance of a specialized 
computer system for the search of keys for a reasonable period. 
Calculation of possible key variants K у in this case we carry out using Internation-
al Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) proceeding from the equation (10) based on 
a set of admissible values of pseudorandom number {t} [9]. 
As a result, it should be noted that access to information of the “true” random data 
generator and methods of its substitution in each case depends on the hardware and 
software platforms on which the IPPF, the peculiarities of its implementation, the 
presence of an automated system of protection against unauthorized interference. her 
work, etc. To create a fictitious random number generator, it is possible to use a se-
quence of Mersenne numbers 𝑀𝑝 = 2
𝑝 − 1, if 𝑝 is a simple number, 𝑀𝑝 also simple. 
4 Methods of Analysis 
It is known that the efficiency of the IDS system significantly depends on the applied 
method of analysis of the original data. Currently, the following main methods are 
distinguished [1]: 
1. Signature methods of analysis. 
2. Statistical methods of analysis. 
3. Hybrid methods of analysis with the function of self-learning. 
4.1 Signature Method 
Signature methods of analysis are based on the fact that most attacks and their scenar-
ios are generally known. In this approach, the signatures of invasions determine the 
characteristics and conditions of the objects, the occurrence of events that are signs of 
attempted attacks (invasion), and their relationship. Of course, signature methods of 
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analysis use intrusion signature databases that are supported by the security system. In 
this case, the order (sequence) of actions performed or initiated by the user or infor-
mation process (program) is compared with known signatures. A sign of an attempted 
security breach may be partial compliance of the sequence of events with the signa-
ture. 
Anti-virus scanners that work with a database of virus signatures are typical repre-
sentatives which implement this idea. Their advantage is a fairly high speed of analy-
sis. The effectiveness of signature methods of IDS can be increased through the use of 
methods of artificial intelligence. The advantages of statistical methods of analysis in 
IDS include: 
 No need for a large amount of memory to store controlled variables. 
 Ease of detecting deviations in the data characterizing the behavior of users and 
processes. 
 Ability to analyze quantitative and qualitative data of different nature of origin as a 
parameter in the analysis. 
 Disadvantages of statistical methods include difficulties in generating statistics of 
the normal behavior of users and processes. 
4.2 Hybrid Method 
Hybrid methods of analysis with the function of self-learning include: 
 Teaching methods for the classification of examples. 
 Neural networks. 
 Genetic algorithms. 
To achieve the goal set in the work, it is advisable to use statistical methods exactly. 
This allows, using the well-known “problem of disorder” [10]: to form a two-stage 
criterion for the detection of anomalies in computer networks, to overcome the con-
nection of statistical methods to the model of usual (normal) users’ behavior. 
Step 1. Let’s suppose that two complex hypotheses are considered concerning the 
random sequence 𝑋 = {𝑥𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡 ∈ 𝑅, 𝑡 = 1, 𝑁̅̅ ̅̅ ̅} under analysis: H0: the sequence X is 
stationary with a single probability distribution function, H1: the sequence X is a con-
catenation (the result of “gluing”) of two stationary random sequences with different 
distribution functions: 
 𝑋 = 𝑋1||𝑋2, (11) 
where 𝑋1 = {𝑥𝑡 , 𝑡 = 1, 𝑛
∗̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }, 𝑋2 = {𝑥𝑡 , 𝑡 = 𝑛
∗ + 1, 𝑁̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ }, 𝑛∗ = [𝜃𝑁], 0 < 𝜃 < 1 
It is necessary to estimate the point of “gluing” n*. It is believed that the sequences 
X1 and X2 differ in one of the two-dimensional distribution functions, namely, the 
probability distribution of the vector (𝑥𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡+2): 
 𝐹(𝑢0, 𝑢1) = 𝑃{𝑥𝑡 ≤ 𝑢0, 𝑥𝑡+2 ≤ 𝑢1} (12) 
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to the moment 𝑡1
∗ = 𝑛∗ − 2 including is equal to F1(u), and at 𝑡 ≥ 𝑡2
∗ = 𝑛∗ + 1 is 
equal to F2(u), and 
 ||𝐹1(𝑢) − 𝐹2(𝑢)|| ≥ > 0, (13) 
where ||…|| is normal sup-norm. 
It is known that the distribution function of a finite-dimensional random vector can 
be approximated uniformly with any accuracy to the probability distribution function 
of a random vector with a finite number of values. It follows that if we give the set R 
is a combination of a sufficiently large number of domains {𝐴𝑗, 𝑗 = 1, 𝑟̅̅ ̅̅ }, that do not 
intersect 𝐴𝑖 ∩ 𝐴𝑗 = ∅   for i ≠ j, then the vector (𝑥𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡+2) can be approximated by a 
distribution vector with a finite number of values [11]. 
Therefore, if we are to enter new random sequences 
 𝑉𝑡
𝑖𝑗
= 𝐼(𝑥𝑡 ∈ 𝐴𝑖, 𝑥𝑡+2 ∈ 𝐴𝑗), де 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑟, 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑟, (14) 
where I(A) is an indicator of the set A, then at least in one of them there is a change in 
mathematical expectation. 
Therefore, if we use an algorithm that detects a change in mathematical expecta-
tion, the same algorithm will detect a change in the distribution function. This fact 
allowed the work to be limited to the development of only one, a basic algorithm that 
can detect changes in the mathematical expectation. To do this, to identify moments 
of “disorders” a family of statistics of the form is proposed: 
 𝑌𝑁(𝑛, 𝛿) = [
𝑛
𝑁
(1 −
𝑛
𝑁
)]
𝛿
∙ [
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑥𝑘 −
1
𝑁−𝑛
𝑛
𝑘=1 ∑ 𝑥𝑘
𝑁
𝑘=𝑛+1 ], (15) 
where 0 < 𝛿 ≤ 1, 1 ≤ 𝑛 ≤ 𝑁 − 1, 𝑋 = {𝑥𝑘 , 𝑘 = 1, 𝑁̅̅ ̅̅ ̅}} is the sequence under 
study. 
The given family of statistics in the case of a fixed n is a generalized variant of 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov’s statistics, which is used to test hypotheses of coincidence or 
difference of distribution functions in two samples. The paper also proves that the 
statistics in the case of 𝛿 = 1 for 𝑁 → ∞ and maintaining the ratio between the vol-
umes of “glued” implementations minimizes the maximum possible probability of 
error estimating the moment of “disorder” (minimax in order): 
 𝑃 { max
1≤𝑛≤𝑁−1
√𝑁|𝑌𝑁(𝑛, 1)| > 𝐶
(1) } →  
 2 ∑ (−1)𝑘+1∞𝑘=1 exp (−2𝑘
2 (
С(1)
𝜎∗
)
2
) ≡ 𝑓(𝐶(1)), (16) 
where the parameter 𝜎∗ is the standard deviation, С
(1) is the limit of the criterion, the 
excess of which will be perceived as the occurrence of “disorder,” the value of 𝑛∗, for 
which it occurred, is the desired moment of “disorder.” 
Step 2. Having fixed the level of probability  “false alarm” about the disorder, 
during the statistical processing of real data we determine the level of the threshold of 
the first level C(1): 
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 𝛼 = 𝑓(𝐶(1) √𝑁 𝜎∗̅⁄ ), (17) 
where 𝜎∗̅ is the estimate of the parameter 𝜎∗ (standard deviation), and N is the sample 
volume of the sequence under study [12]. 
In the case of hypothesis Н1 on the representation of the original sequence of 
measurements in the form of the concatenation of several stationary random sequenc-
es with different probability distribution functions, we apply the criterion of the al-
lowable number of triggers (“disorders”) Z. That is, we assume that the following 
equation takes place: 
 𝑛1 + 𝑛2 +  … + 𝑛𝑍 = 𝑁, де 2 ≤ 𝑍 < 𝑁 − 2. (18) 
For a small number of sequences, the Chebyshev inequality can be used to determine 
the boundary of the criterion if the random variable Z has a mathematical expectation 
 and a standard deviation  for a given > 0: 
 𝑃{|𝑍 − 𝜇| ≥ } ≤
𝜎2
2   (19) 
If Z is a random variable with a single-mode probability distribution with a mathemat-
ical expectation  and a standard deviation of 0 < 𝜎 < ∞, then for any 𝜆 > √8 3⁄ ≈
1.63299, there is a Vysochansky-Petunin inequality, which improves the estimation 
of the deviation probability: 
 𝑃{|𝑍 − 𝜇| ≥ 𝜆𝜎} ≤
4
9𝜆2
  (20) 
In particular, for a typical deviation of 3σ (three sigmas), the significance level of the 
criterion is the probability of “false alarm” is calculated as [13]: 
 𝛼 =
4
9𝜆2
≈ 0.0494. (21) 
A more accurate result can be obtained for the case of a random variable Z, which is 
the sum of a sufficiently large number of independent random variables (𝑚 → ∞): 
 𝑍 = 𝑧1 + 𝑧2 + … + 𝑧𝑚 . (22) 
According to the integral limit theorem, the probability of deviation can be approxi-
mated by the normal probability distribution function 𝑁(0,1): 
 𝑃 {|
𝑍−𝜇
𝜎
| ≥ 𝑡1−𝛼} =
1
√2𝜋
∫ exp (−
𝑡2
2
𝑡1−𝛼
−∞
)𝑑𝑡. (23) 
Based on (12), we calculate the boundary of the second level criterion: 
 𝐶(2) = 𝜇 + 𝑡1−𝛼𝜎 . (24) 
Thus, the algorithm for calculating the criterion includes the following steps (Fig. 1). 
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Fig. 1. Intrusion detection algorithm. 
It is possible to see that the complexity of the algorithm that implements the proposed 
criterion is estimated by the value of O(N). Thus, its implementation on the principle 
of the “sliding window” will not cause a significant load on the computer system. 
The most difficult issue for the implementation of the method of detecting anoma-
lies, as in other statistical methods, is the formation of regular behavior of the network 
infrastructure and its users. 
5 Conclusions 
In this regard, of particular interest are modern technologies that increase the efficien-
cy of classical decryption methods [6], which using vulnerabilities in a particular 
cryptographic algorithm and/or protocol provide recovery of the secret key used to 
create encrypted messages, and/or disclosing the original value of the encrypted in-
formation. Thus recovery of the initial information can be full or partial therefore 
speak about full or partial decryption. 
A two-level statistical criterion for detecting anomalies based on measurements of 
network infrastructure characteristics is proposed, which provides the possibility of 
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their further analysis to identify them with certain computer attacks. The application 
of the criterion does not require significant computing resources and provides an op-
portunity to respond to possible attacks in almost real-time. 
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